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WHY LAND TENURE REFORM IS THE KEY TO
POLITICAL STABILITY IN TONGA
Kersti Harter Kennedy†
Abstract: The Kingdom of Tonga, a South Pacific country, erupted in violent prodemocracy riots in late 2006 after decades of political unease. Tonga’s people are
divided into two main classes: the nobles and the commoners. These two classes have
long differed in political and land rights in a hierarchy that is typical of chiefdoms such as
Tonga. Tonga’s government has attempted to deal with the sometimes violent,
commoner-led pro-democracy movement by amending its Constitution to allow
commoners to vote for more of the members of the Legislative Assembly. The resulting
government and the noblemen have not, however, shown a commitment to land reform in
favor of commoners, and it is unlikely that the recent amendments will result in changes
to the land tenure system. In Tonga, the rising population and declining land productivity
within a context of insecure land rights have prompted individuals to engage in conflict
with the government and nobility, both of which have become less powerful.
Evolutionary ecology predicts this result, and, in conjunction with insights from
economics, is also a fertile approach for finding solutions to political instability. This
comment argues that only extensive land reform will likely end political violence in
Tonga. It suggests changes in the Constitution and the Land Act to end or reduce the
nobles’ power over commoner lands, to allow for more commoners to occupy land, and
to improve the productivity of commoner lands. These changes would require Tongans
to place individual liberties above some cultural traditions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 22, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
praised the Kingdom of Tonga for “taking another step toward democracy”
through its unprecedented election, in which the nation’s commoner class
voted for a majority of the Legislative Assembly members.1 Secretary
Clinton’s sentiment has since been echoed, with many Westerners
applauding Tonga’s efforts at achieving democracy.2
†

J.D. expected 2012. Please direct comments to kersti.kennedy@gmail.com. I would like to thank
Professor Clark B. Lombardi of the University of Washington School of Law for his advice and support,
and Professor John Ziker of the Boise State University Department of Anthropology for his review of Part
IV. Thanks also to my husband Eric, parents Reid and Portia, brother Eamonn, and friend and colleague
Linda Thompson. Thanks to Aura Weinbaum, Grant Lea, Marcus Pearson, Elizabeth Sher, Joe Stockton,
Tia Aneja Sargent, Ada Ko Wong, and the other members of this journal for their support and edits. Any
errors or omissions are my own.
1
US Praises Democratic PM Move in Tonga, GOOGLE NEWS, Dec. 22, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKdFqXLpZ3itR9LvUFC-oqgN_tNA?docId=CN
G.68697541854bfd3351f30efeb7965b11.361.
2
For example, the U.S. State Department has been especially supportive of Tonga’s political
reforms: “I applaud the Tongan government for promoting democracy through political reforms and
preserving the balance of power enshrined in your Constitution.” Victoria Nuland, The Kingdom of
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In the shadows of the warm reception, however, lurks the possibility
of continued political violence like the 2006 riots. On November 16, 2006,
pro-democracy rioters destroyed much of the capital of Nuku‘alofa,
targeting government- and elite-controlled property.3
The government ultimately responded to the violence by increasing
the number of commoner representatives in the Legislative Assembly.4
Commoners comprise a majority of Tonga’s population of over 100,000
people,5 while there are only thirty-three nobles.6 Commoners and nobles,
however, used to have nine representatives each in parliament,7 even though
commoners outnumbered nobles in population. In November 2009, a
Constitutional committee recommended introducing a parliament in which
commoners would choose a majority of the members.8 The amended
Constitution did away with an assembly that the powerful noblemen had
previously dominated.9 In November 2010, the election under the new
Constitution finally took place.10
In light of Tonga’s history, the de jure changes to Tongan law were
revolutionary. Tonga is the last remaining monarchy in the South Pacific,11
and though a constitutional monarchy, it has functioned more like a
dictatorship, with the king or queen controlling the government.12 Although
never formally colonized, Tonga became a British protectorate in 1901 but
remained autonomous in its domestic affairs; in 1970, it became fully
independent.13 The Tongan monarchy and nobility have thus been
paramount in the country’s governance, even through the protectorate
period.
Tonga’s Constitution Day, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176613.htm.
3
See
Tongan
Riots
After
Reforms
Delay,
BBC NEWS,
Nov.
16,
2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6153238.stm.
4
See Audrey Young, Tongans Ready to Vote Under ‘Ordinary Peoples’ Constitution, N.Z.
HERALD, Nov. 25, 2010, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10689869.
5
See Tonga, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS—GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA EXPLORER,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:TON
&dl=en&hl=en&q=tonga%27s+population (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
6
MARTIN DALY, TONGA: A NEW BIBLIOGRAPHY 9 (2009).
7
See id.
8
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, 115 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/special/cec_final_report.pdf [hereinafter CEC FINAL REPORT].
9
See Young, supra note 4.
10
Id.
11
GEORGE E. MARCUS, THE NOBILITY AND THE CHIEFLY TRADITION IN THE MODERN KINGDOM OF
TONGA 2 (The Polynesian Society, Inc. 1980) (1978).
12
See DALY, supra note 6, at 9.
13
JERRY DUPONT, THE COMMON LAW ABROAD 1215, 1216-18 (2001).
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The monarchy and nobility’s control of much of the population is not
surprising considering Tonga’s ecology. The country’s population is dense,
owing to its successful agricultural intensification.14 This population is
spread over three main island groups in the South Pacific between Fiji and
New Zealand.15 Tonga has long been a “chiefdom,”16 which can be defined
as “an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages or
communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief.”17
Chiefdoms commonly appear in circumscribed island environments where
competition for resources is fierce.18
Tonga transitioned legally to a constitutional monarchy in 1875,19 but
the hierarchy of the chiefdom has largely remained and will likely continue,
even with the Constitutional amendments. The monarchy and nobles will
probably work to keep the land tenure system of the chiefdom intact because
competition over land continues to grow, and the social and legal hierarchy
of the chiefdom ensures that those in charge can control land use and access.
The pro-democracy movement and the 2006 riots indicate that commoners
are ready to change the system, with violence if necessary.
Human behavioral ecology (“HBE”),20 a theoretical branch of
evolutionary anthropology, provides possible long-term solutions to Tonga’s
instability, because it looks at root causes of human conflict. This comment
uses evolutionary ecological theory, in conjunction with insights from
economics, to argue that insecure land rights, rising population, and
declining land productivity, combined with the decreasing power of the
nobles, has led to the recent commoner uprising and pro-democracy
movement. Further, although the Tongan government has attempted to solve
its instability problems by increasing political representation for commoners,
the recent amendments are unlikely to change land laws. Therefore,
instability will continue until Tonga reforms its land laws and policies or
makes extensive political reforms ultimately resulting in land tenure

14

Shankar Aswani & Michael W. Graves, The Tongan Maritime Expansion: A Case in the
Evolutionary Ecology of Social Complexity, 37 ASIAN PERSP. 135, 143 (1998).
15
DALY, supra note 6, at 1.
16
Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 144.
17
Robert L. Carneiro, The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State, in THE TRANSITION TO STATEHOOD IN
THE NEW WORLD 37, 45 (G. D. Jones & R. R. Kautz eds., 1981) (defining “chiefdom”).
18
Id. at 64.
19
DALY, supra note 6, at 9.
20
HBE is defined as “the evolutionary ecology of human behaviour. Its central focus is how the
behaviour of modern humans reflects our species’ history of natural selection.” Monique BorgerhoffMulder, Human Behavioural Ecology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SCIENCES 1, 1 (2003).
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changes. The proposed changes require Tongans to place individual liberties
above some cultural traditions.
The remainder of this comment supports this thesis. Part II provides
the legal and historical background leading up to the pro-democracy
movement. Part III examines the Tongan government’s attempts to deal with
instability by modestly changing the structure of the Legislative Assembly.
Part IV argues that, to stabilize Tonga and quell future violence, the
government must reform its land laws and policies.21 Working within the
current governmental framework, this comment offers several possibilities
for amending the Constitution and the Land Act to end or reduce the nobles’
power over commoner lands, to allow for more commoners to occupy land
and to create new policies to improve the productivity of commoner lands.
This comment addresses the problem of political violence, which Tongans
recognize and ostensibly want to solve, but it argues that the adopted
solution is insufficient. It therefore takes a consequentialist perspective to
legal and policy reforms, though the changes prescribed may accord with
deontological perspectives as well. Those who applaud Tonga for its
growing acceptance of “democracy” should keep in mind that Tonga is not
only far from being a free society, but also that the nation must make
extensive reforms before achieving its goal of stability.
II.

TONGAN LAW MAINTAINED A DISPARITY BETWEEN COMMONER AND
NOBLE RIGHTS, BUT THE PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT DEMANDED
CHANGE

As mentioned in Part I, pre-Constitutional Tonga was a chiefdom with
an inegalitarian political system. The Constitution of 1875, and later, the
Land Act, reduced the nobility’s power and respected commoner rights
somewhat, but the commoner-noble distinction remained largely intact. The
pro-democracy movement reacted to this disparity, eventually ushering in
the recent Constitutional reforms. Subsections A and B detail Tongan law
and history related to land and political rights before the 2009 amendments
in two main stages: 1) before and 2) after the Constitution of 1875.
Subsection C then explains how the pro-democracy movement and riots
encouraged the 2010 changes. This part discusses law in a broad sense,
21
When discussing land reform, this comment uses a broader definition to include reforms that seek
to increase the ability of commoners to access land and secure their rights in it, rather than simply
redistributive reforms. See Roy L. Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century:
New Challenges, New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 763 (2006).

MARCH 2012

LAND TENURE REFORM IN TONGA

331

viewing the customary legal system of pre-Constitutional Tonga as equally
as legal as the laws of Constitutional Tonga.22
A.

Pre-Constitutional Tonga Was a Chiefdom Wherein Commoners Had
Few Rights

Humans have lived in Tonga for around 3,000 years.23 Most of the
Tongan islands stretch over 300 square kilometers of the South Pacific, and
are bunched into the four groups of Tongatapu, Ha‘apai, Vava‘u, and
Niuatoputapu.24 Tonga has a dense population due to its extensive and
successful agriculture.25
Tonga’s population density induced an ancient battle for control of the
islands.26 Large monuments appeared around 1000 C.E., suggesting a power
struggle among chiefs resulting in the advertisement of chiefly abilities.27
By the eighteenth century C.E., the four island groups were politically
integrated into the Tongan chiefdom.28 A monarch has ruled this expanding
chiefdom beginning as early as 950 C.E., when the first Tu‘i Tonga king is
believed to have lived.29 Local chiefs controlled smaller social units, and
their seniority depended on their relationship to the sacred Tu‘i Tonga.30 As
mentioned before, this type of polity is called a “chiefdom.”31
The precise nature of commoner rights in the chiefdom is unclear,
with different scholars reaching different conclusions. Earlier scholars
“depict chiefs as having a rather despotic domination over commoners,”
whereas later researchers characterize the relationship between the classes as

22

One evolutionary legal scholar has defined law as “all rules that are necessary to a stable society.
All law that is meant to keep a society stable can be called law, even if it results in the suffering of
members of society.” HENDRIK GOMMER, A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW: NATURAL LAW THEORY
REVISITED 35 (2011).
23
Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 142.
24
Id. at 140.
25
Id. at 143.
26
See id. at 143-44.
27
Id. at 143; see generally Geoffrey Clark, David Burley & Tim Murray, Monumentality and the
Development of the Tongan Maritime Chiefdom, 82 ANTIQUITY 994 (2008) (discussing Tongatapu’s
megalithic tombs and their link to the expansion of the Tongan chiefdom).
28
Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 143-44.
29
MARCUS, supra note 11, at 6 n.5.
30
Kerry James, Right and Privilege in Tongan Land Tenure, in LAND, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE IN
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 157, 160 (R. Gerard Ward & Elizabeth Kingdon eds., 1995).
31
See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 45.
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one of interdependence.32 The former opinion fits better with the general
pattern seen in chiefdoms.33
The chiefs undoubtedly had extensive control over the commoners’
land rights. Chiefs gained control of land by force or through loyalty to a
higher chief.34 In a system often referred to as “feudal,” these chiefs would
give land to matapules (chiefs’ attendants) to dole out to patrilineal descent
groups.35 Though the kin groups held some land rights, the chief had
authority to terminate these rights.36 The people worked on this land as
subsistence farmers, and the chiefs kept any surplus.37 The chiefs acted
more like rulers than landlords,38 a pattern that is common in chiefdoms.39
Around 1797, the Tongan chiefdom broke out into a civil war that
continued throughout the first half of the 1800s.40 The war was much
bloodier than previous internal fighting because Westerners had introduced
modern weaponry into Tonga.41 During this period, Tāufa‘āhua, the son of
the ruling chief of the Ha‘apai island group, was growing up and learning to
be a warrior.42 Tāufa‘āhua was a primary instigator in the continuing war as
he attempted to gain power over more of the islands.43 By 1830, his power
extended over Ha‘apai, and he had converted to Christianity and renamed
himself King George after the English king.44 By 1833, he had consolidated
Ha‘apai and Vava‘u under his power.45
In 1839, King George implemented the Vava‘u Code on these two
island groups.46 This code appointed judges to rule on criminal matters,
32
Charles J. Stevens, Symbolic Action and Soil Fertility: Political Ecology and the Transformation
of Space and Place in Tonga, in POLITICAL ECOLOGY ACROSS SPACES, SCALES, AND SOCIAL GROUPS 154,
160 (Susan Paulson & Lisa Gezon eds., 2005).
33
See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 67.
34
See James, supra note 30, at 160.
35
See Christopher G. Crawford, Tongan Land Management: Putting the Brakes on the Global
Economy, 36 J. OF PAC. HIS. 93, 94 (2001); see also Alaric Maude & Feleti Sevele, Tonga: Equality
Overtaking Privilege, in LAND TENURE IN THE PACIFIC 114, 115-16 (Ron Crocombe ed., 1987).
36
Crawford, supra note 35, at 94.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 67.
40
See NOEL RUTHERFORD, SHIRLEY BAKER AND THE KING OF TONGA 8 (1971).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Helen Morton, Remembering Freedom and the Freedom to Remember: Tongan Memories of
Independence, in CULTURAL MEMORY: RECONFIGURING HISTORY AND IDENTITY IN THE POSTCOLONIAL
PACIFIC 37, 39 (Jeanette Marie Mageo ed., 2001).
44
See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 8-9.
45
Id. at 9.
46
Tim René Salomon, Comment, A Balancing Act: Modern Equality vs. Traditional Nobility in
Tonga, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 369, 375 (2009).
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limiting the local chiefs’ powers.47 The code also mandated that judges treat
subjects equally.48
Further, chiefs could no longer forcefully take
agricultural produce from commoners, and they could now be tried like any
other Tongan for their actions.49
In 1845, King George, who became known as Tupou I, officially
became king of Tonga by bringing the Tongatapu island group under his
rule50 and instituted the Code of Law for All Tongans in 1850.51 This code
purported to create a uniform law for all Tongans, regardless of chiefly
status.52 In addition, Tupou I claimed title to all of Tonga’s land.53 Sales of
land to foreigners were prohibited, with leasing permitted upon government
approval.54
Continuing with his lawmaking streak and growing power, Tupou I
created the Emancipation Edict of 1862, which ostensibly reduced much of
the chiefs’ power over the commoners.55 In addition to ending the forced
labor and tithing systems, the edict compelled the chiefs to “allot portions of
land to the people as they may need, which shall be their farm, and as long
as the people pay their tribute, and their rent to the chief, it shall not be
lawful for any chief to dispossess them.”56
The Emancipation Edict of 1862, along with the Vava‘u Code and the
Code of Law for All Tongans, could be seen as expanding commoner rights
vis-à-vis their chiefs. Tupou I’s motivations in creating these codes should
not be seen as entirely altruistic—he may have been simply trying to reduce
his rivals’ power.57 Regardless of Tupou I’s motivations, the Emancipation
Edict allowed for the continued vitality of the chief-commoner disparity in
land rights by granting chiefs the authority to receive tributes and rents in
exchange for land. When Tupou I promulgated the Constitution of 1875, he
simply transformed some chiefs into nobles, thus maintaining the ancient
hierarchy.58 Though commoners were better off with Tupou I’s reforms, he
47

Id. at 376.
Id.
49
ELISE HUFFER, GRANDS HOMMES ET PETITES ÎLES: LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DE FIDJI, DE TONGA
ET DU VANUATU 40 (1993).
50
RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10.
51
Salomon, supra note 46, at 376.
52
RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10.
53
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 119.
54
Id.
55
See id.
56
Id. (citing Thomas West, TEN YEARS IN SOUTH-CENTRAL POLYNESIA (1865)).
57
RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10.
58
See Salomon, supra note 46, at 376.
48
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ultimately allowed chiefs to retain many of the powers they held in the
chiefdom.
B.

The Constitution of 1875 and Land Act Did Little to Improve
Commoners’ Political and Land Rights

Shirley Waldemar Baker, an Englishman and Methodist missionary,
officially became Tupou I’s advisor in 1872 and assisted him in Tonga’s
governance.59 Their relationship grew out of mutual need—Baker needed
Tupou I’s support to establish his dream of an independent Tongan church,
while Tupou I needed Baker’s help to deal with the encroaching European
powers.60 Creating a Tongan Constitution was high on Baker’s priority
list.61 In 1873, Baker began drafting Tonga’s Constitution after consulting
with Australian and Hawaiian politicians, and when he finished the draft, he
sent it to a firm of Auckland lawyers to tweak the language.62 On
November 4, 1875, a fakataha, an assembly of title-holding chiefs, accepted
the Constitution upon Tupou I’s urging.63
The new Constitution consisted of 132 articles and was divided into
three sections: 1) individual rights, 2) form of government, and 3) land
tenure.64 The Constitution, though recognizing some commoner rights,
perpetuated disparities in political power and property rights. Clause 4
proclaims that “[t]here shall be but one law in Tonga for chiefs and
commoners,”65 but the balance of the Constitution shows that this is a
qualified statement.
The disparity in rights in Constitutional Tonga originates with
Tupou I’s creation of a landed nobility.66 After the fakataha approved the
Constitution, Tupou I proceeded to name only 20 of the chiefs as the new
Tongan nobility, declaring, “I will read out the names of the nobles and in
case some of you might be hurt because your names are not included, The
[c]onstitution has this to say about it ‘The King will appoint 20 nobles.’”67
These nobles received estates with the power to lease lots from them to
59

RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 55.
62
Id.
63
See id. at 55-56; see also Tupou I, The Speech of His Majesty Tupou I at the Close of Parliament
on 4th November, 1875, in TONGAN LAW REPORTS, Vol. II 3, 3 (D.B. Hunter ed., 1963).
64
RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 56.
65
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 4 (“Same law for all classes”).
66
See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 58.
67
Tupou I, supra note 63, at 3.
60
61
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commoners, as well as positions in the Legislative Assembly.68 Baker and
Tupou I likely created the new nobility in order to placate the more powerful
chiefs.69
This new nobility was undoubtedly privileged under the Constitution
in both political and land rights. Clauses 32, 60, 67, and 71 placed limits on
commoner political rights.70 Clause 60, for example, established the scheme
for representation in the Legislative Assembly.71 Originally, it guaranteed
each noble a spot in the Legislative Assembly, with an equal number of
commoner representatives allotted by region,72 although commoners
certainly outnumbered nobles. In 1914, this number was reduced to seven of
each class, and was later increased to nine of each class.73
Besides creating inequality in representation, the Constitution made
certain subjects off-limits for the People’s (commoners’) Representatives.
For example, Clause 32 established that in certain cases, the nobility may
select successors to the throne without commoner input.74 Further, Clause
67, titled “Privilege of nobles,” states that “it shall be lawful for only the
nobles of the Legislative Assembly to discuss or vote upon laws relating to
the King or Royal Family or the titles and inheritances of the nobles.”75
Additionally, Clause 71 prohibited commoner representatives from
participating in trials to impeach nobles.76 The effect of these articles is both
that commoners are underrepresented in the Legislative Assembly, and also
that their representatives have limited powers on subjects related to the
nobles and monarchy.77
The Constitution also vested the twenty new nobles with some special
land rights, while limiting every man’s control over his land. Clause 104
states that “[a]ll the land is the property of the King” and allows for the
68

Id. at 4-5.
See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 58.
70
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988).
71
Id. at cl. 60 (“Representative members”).
72
MARCUS, supra note 11, at 74.
73
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 60 (“Representative members”).
74
Id. at cl. 32 (“Succession to the Throne”); see also Salomon, supra note 46, at 371.
75
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 67 (“Privilege of nobles”); see also Salomon,
supra note 46, at 372.
76
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 71 (“Noble may be deprived of his seat”); see
also Salomon, supra note 46, at 372.
77
See generally Salomon, supra note 46, at 371-73. Besides the Legislative Assembly, commoners
also receive some representation via the fono, or public meeting, held by a noble, a government official, or
the town, or village. The meetings may be held so that the chief can give orders, but some may be willing
to allow commoners to influence local decision-making. Ropate Qalo, Tonga, in DECENTRALISATION IN
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 238, 242 (Peter Larmour & Ropate Qalo eds., 1985).
69
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nobles of Tupou I’s choosing to have hereditary estates that only other
nobles may inherit.78 Though no one may sell land, they may lease it in
accordance with the Constitution—Clause 105 limits the term of leases to 99
years, unless the Privy Council gives approval otherwise.79 Further,
Clause 114 requires the cabinet’s approval for all leases, subleases, and
transfers lasting 99 years or less, and the Privy Council’s approval when
over 99 years.80
Tupou I intended that the nobles would allot land from their hereditary
estates to commoners.81 On the close of the new parliament on November 4,
1875, however, Tupou I implored his newly-created nobility not to be hasty
in making allotments to commoners.82 The nobles must have taken this
seriously—they had granted no allotments by 1880.83 To remedy this,
Shirley Baker became minister of lands in 1880 and two years later created
the Land Act, which “established the right of each male Tongan of taxpaying
age sixteen to be granted a town allotment and a gardening or ‘tax’ allotment
by the owner of the estate on which he lived.”84 Tax allotments are heritable
in the male line and are to be up to 8.25 acres.85 The same year, Tupou I
granted thirty hereditary estates to an expanded nobility and six to
matapules, or the spokesmen for the chiefs.86 The rest of the land became
government land, so commoner allotments are apportioned from the
hereditary nobles’ estates, from land held by the monarchy, and from some
land designated as “government” land.87 A majority of commoners live on
the hereditary nobles’ estates.88
The Land Act has not changed much since 1882. In 1891, however,
the Act was changed to make the government responsible for granting
allotments, and the estate-holders had only the right to receive the rent.89
78
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 104 (“Land vested in crown—sale prohibited”);
see also Salomon, supra note 46, at 372.
79
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 105 (“Terms of leases”). The status of this
clause is unclear after the 2010 Constitutional amendments related to executive power. See CEC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 8, at 108.
80
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 114 (“No lease etc. without consent”). The
status of this clause is unclear after the 2010 Constitutional amendments related to executive power. See
CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 108.
81
Tupou I, supra note 63, at 5.
82
Id.
83
See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 99.
84
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120.
85
The Land Act of 1988, § 7 (“Right to allotment”) (Tonga).
86
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 121.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 120.
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The trend toward limiting the nobles’ power over the land was reversed in
1915, when nobles earned the statutory right to be consulted before the
minister of lands could make an allotment on their estates.90 The Land Act
also requires commoner occupants to pay their nobles a yearly rent.91
In 1976, the Land Act was amended to allow for mortgages of
allotments, and in 1980, the maximum mortgage period was set to thirty
years.92 In practice, the mortgages allowed by the Land Act are not very
valuable, as banks may only foreclose on the remaining period; banks are
thus reluctant to make loans.93
Commoners were also granted the ability to lease out their tax
allotments for up to 10 years and town allotments for up to 99 years with the
cabinet’s approval and for more than 99 years with the Privy Council’s
approval.94 The cabinet has tended to allow increasingly shorter leases,
usually of 50 years; the 99-year leases are rare.95 The cabinet may place
other restrictions on the leases as well.96
The specialized Land Court hears any disputes involving the Land
97
Act. The king and the Privy Council appoint the judge of the Land Court
and a panel of assessors.98 An appeal lies of right, but this appeal must be
taken to the Privy Council rather than to the supreme court.99 The king also
appoints a minister of lands in his Privy Council, who is invariably a
noble.100
Though an allotment is legally due to them, many Tongan men will
not receive one. In practice, it is easiest for men to inherit land.101 However,
Tongan families are large, so many men will not inherit land and must
acquire a vacant allotment.102 This can be difficult because in some areas all
the allotments have been registered.103

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 120-21.
The Land Act of 1988, § 31 (“Holder’s right to rents”) (Tonga).
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 121.
Crawford, supra note 35, at 98.
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Once a Tongan man finds an allotment, his difficulties may not end.
Nobles can continue to exercise power over the commoners in allotting
parcels of their estates:
Noble lands have not been completely allocated and/or
registered. A noble’s signature is required before land on a
noble’s estate can be registered in a commoner’s name. Many
nobles are reluctant to allow their people to register land. By
simply allocating land for commoners’ use but not allowing
registration, the noble retains control over the land. The
promise of registration requires that the commoner remain on
good relations with the noble. This often means obeying the
noble’s orders and providing him with ‘gifts’ of food, money,
handicrafts or imported goods. It may also mean leaving the
land to make way for someone (often foreigners) who has the
capital to lease the land for themselves from the noble.104
Thus, finding an open allotment on a noble’s estate will not guarantee
security in land rights for the commoner occupant. The Land Act’s
requirement of noble approval for allotment allows for these extra-legal
abuses.
The lucky men who do register their allotments may face additional
hurdles. The Land Act requires that holders of registered allotments pay
eighty seniti (totaling only about fifty U.S. cents) in yearly rent for their
holdings.105 Those on nobles’ estates must pay this to the noble; the nobles
frequently ask for payment in the form of tribute of other items.106 These
tributes often exceed the statutorily-mandated amount, and the sum
requested may be “debilitating.”107 In this system, the noble acts much like
a traditional chief, and it is unclear whether commoners go along with it
because they believe it is legally required or for some other reason.108 It also
does not seem that they do this because of fear of eviction—few people have
104

Crawford, supra note 35, at 96.
The Land Act of 1988, § 31 (“Holder’s right to rents”) (Tonga).
106
Crawford, supra note 35, at 96.
107
Id.
108
Id. One anthropologist described the nobles’ demands (often couched as traditional feasting
obligations) as hostile: “Feasting obligations require long-range planning by farmers, and an unexpected
feast demanded by a chief or noble may upset otherwise carefully managed smallholder resources.”
Stevens, supra note 32, at 156. Each family may have to contribute as much as “six piglets, the quarter
section of one large pig, one roasted goat, two large baked fish, eighty kilograms of yams, about fifty
kilograms of sweet potatoes, and three twenty-kilogram giant taro” as well as firewood, lobster, and even
octopus. Id. at 157-58.
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been evicted from their allotments.109 For whatever reason that commoners
allow this manipulation, the Land Act’s mandate that rent be paid to the
noble legally enables it.
In 1984, allotted, unregistered land made up 19.28% of the total area
of Tonga, with 43.28% held as registered allotments, 8.07% under leasehold,
and only 6.94% remaining to be allotted.110 This means that (if these or
similar statistics still hold true) nobles could cause insecurity in land rights
on much of Tonga’s land. Meanwhile, the population of Tonga continues to
grow, and the government can no longer provide the statutory allotment
owed to its men in some areas.111 The scarcity of land and the insecurity in
existing allotments create a precarious situation for Tongan commoners.
These legal and factual issues have caused a black market in land
tenure to appear. Beginning around the first half of the twentieth century,
Tonga’s commoners have “bought” and “sold” allotments illegally to others,
although what they are really doing is buying the landholder’s right to use
the allotment.112
The government largely ignores these extra-legal
113
exchanges.
Though the black market can provide commoners with
income, it falls far short of providing the benefits that institutionallyrecognized land rights could bring.
While Tonga has changed in its structure from chiefdom to
Constitutional monarchy over the past 137 years, it has enshrined and
perpetuated the disparity between commoners and nobility in both property
and political rights through positive law and de facto practice. As one writer
put it, “[r]oyalty and nobility effectively work together through
Constitutionalized government institutions, to ensure perpetuation of the
monarchy’s and the nobility’s strong position as estate holders.”114 Tonga’s
past and present show that Tongan institutions do enshrine the ancient
hierarchy to the commoners’ detriment.
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The Growing Pro-Democracy Movement, Including the 2006 Riots,
Made it Clear that the Tongan Government Would Have to Reform its
Legal System

The 2006 riots in the capital of Nuku‘alofa shocked the Tongan
government, which appeared ill-prepared to deal with the violence. Dubbed
“16-11,” the November 16, 2006 chaos began as protestors took to the
streets to object to the Legislative Assembly’s plan to adjourn for the year,
though it had done nothing appreciable to honor its promise of advancing
democracy.115 The protestors became violent, tipping cars, burning
buildings, and looting; eventually, eight protestors were killed.116 They
targeted government and elite-owned property and left the business district
in ruins.117 The surprised Tongan government asked New Zealand and
Australia to send troops to quell the riots.118 The next day, the Tongan
government declared a state of emergency in the area, which was not lifted
until February 2011.119 It not only limited the size of gatherings in certain
areas,120 but also allowed police to stop and frisk anyone in the area without
requiring any level of suspicion.121
The riots were the culmination of the modern pro-democracy
movement, which is thought to have originated in the 1970s and 1980s.122
The movement has generally focused on a call for an expanded legislature
and a more accountable executive.123 The pro-democracy reformers held
several Constitutional conventions throughout the 1990s, and they offered
three different proposals for political reforms—one in 1997 and two in
2002.124 There was no discussion of changes to Part III of the Constitution
(“The Land”), and ultimately the Legislative Assembly and executive took
115
Tongan Riots After Reforms Delay, supra note 3; see, e.g., OKUSITINO MAHINA, 16/11 TONGA HE
FEPAKI – TONGA IN CRISIS (2010) (referring to the riots as “16/11”).
116
Tongan Riots After Reforms Delay, supra note 3; Riot Death Toll in Tonga Reaches Eight, RADIO
N.Z. INT’L., Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=28357.
117
See Tongan Riots After Reforms Delay, supra note 3; Guy Powles, Testing Tradition in Tonga:
Approaches to Constitutional Change, 13 REV. JURIDIQUE POLYNESIENNE 111, 112-13 (2007).
118
WikiLeaks Cable: New Zealand Active in Tonga and Fiji, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 20, 2010,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/politics/news/article.cfm?c_id=280&object.
119
Tonga Government Removes Emergency Regulations, RADIO N.Z. INT’L., Feb. 13, 2011,
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=58583.
120
Tonga Continues to Enforce Emergency Regulations a Year After Destructive Riots, RADIO N.Z.
INT’L., Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=36359.
121
See Tonga Reimposes Emergency Regulations, RADIO N.Z. NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008,
http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/world/3616/tonga-reimposes-emergency-regulations.
122
I. C. Campbell, The Quest for Constitutional Reform in Tonga, 40 J. OF PAC. HIS. 91, 92 (2005).
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Id. at 94.
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Id. at 94-102.
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no notice of the proposed reforms, though they were quite conservative in
scope.125
Though the conventions did not discuss land, Tongans have
considered land reform.126 In 1975, the Tonga Council of Churches held a
seminar on land tenure in which many commoners voiced their complaints
about the land tenure system.127 The push for land reform eventually led to
the Land Act amendments allowing mortgages and leases of tax allotments,
but went no further.128 The pro-democracy proponent ‘Akilisi Pohiva has
also called for reform of the land tenure system from time to time, but he has
been largely ignored.129
The riots were seemingly the Tongan government’s final wake-up call
for reform: four years later, an election would be held under a new
Constitution in which commoners would vote for more of the Legislative
Assembly members.130 The next part explains how this purported “ordinary
peoples’ constitution” will change little in Tonga in terms of commoners’
rights, especially land rights.
III.

THE 2010 AMENDMENTS DID LITTLE TO CHANGE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO INFLUENCE LAND LAWS

The pro-democracy movement and the riots were the impetus for the
2010 Constitutional amendments, but whether these amendments will
change anything for commoners is doubtful. This part will: 1) describe the
2010 changes to the Tongan Constitution, which altered the structure of the
Legislative Assembly, 2) argue that these changes have done little to increase
political effectiveness for commoners as the 2010 election shows, and 3)
suggest that these changes will also not lead to commoner-friendly land
reform.
A.

The 2010 Amendments Aimed to Give Commoners Increased Political
Representation

The riots pressured the Legislative Assembly to pass the
Constitutional and Electoral Commission Act in 2008, which created a
125
126
127
128
129
130
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James, supra note 30, at 186.
Id.
Id. at 186-87.
See, e.g., id. at 188.
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commission that is “required to make interim and final reports and
recommendations on Constitutional and electoral reform to the Privy
Council and the Legislative Assembly.”131 In creating policy for these
reforms, the commission’s members went from district to district in Tonga
and held meetings to assess public opinion.132 The Constitutional and
Electoral Commission (“CEC”) created several reports, which detailed the
results of these meetings, and in the last report, the CEC recommended that
Tonga implement a Legislative Assembly with increased commoner
representation.133 The government accepted this advice, amending the
Constitution in 2010.134
The 2010 amendments were seemingly revolutionary. Under the new
Constitution, which has been called the “ordinary peoples’ Constitution,” the
commoners may elect seventeen members of the twenty-six member
Legislative Assembly; previously they could only elect nine of the thirtythree representatives.135 Additionally, the prime minister must be elected
from and recommended by the assembly; before, the king appointed the
prime minister.136 The CEC recommended that the first election under this
“new” Constitution be held in 2010.137
B.

The 2010 Amendments Have Done Little in Practice to Change
Commoner Political Representation

In the November 2010 election, candidates from the Democratic Party
of the Friendly Islands (“DPFI”) and many independent candidates vied for
the seventeen commoner seats.138 DPFI members took eleven seats, and
independents took the remaining six.139 When the parliament met to decide
the new prime minister (“PM”), all of the independents voted with the
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See CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
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nobles and elected the noble Lord Tu‘ivakano as PM.140 Dr. Crosbie Walsh,
a professor of the University of the South Pacific, remarked:
There is an obvious moral to this story. Tonga has taken a small
step forward towards a more representative parliament but
effective power and authority continues to reside in the same
hands . . . . Appearance not substance is what counts. Overseas
armchair democrats and politicians can be content. There has
been an “election”—and little substantial change.141
Walsh’s remarks, made in an online commentary published on
January 3, 2011,142 came during rapid political changes in the new
government in late 2010 and early 2011. The new Tongan PM was already
under fire by December 30, 2010, because he named two unelected ministers
to his cabinet.143 Then, on January 14, 2011, the PM’s new health minister,
the commoner and pro-democracy reformer ‘Akilisi Pohiva, stepped
down.144 Pohiva, a member of DPFI, refused to sign an agreement to not
vote against the government and had previously expressed anger at the
appointment of the two unelected members.145 For these reasons, he stepped
down seventeen days after his appointment.146 After Pohiva’s resignation,
only one DPFI member remains in the cabinet.147
Lord Tu‘ivakano’s election as PM, combined with these rapid changes
soon after the November election, indicate that perhaps the CEC’s suggested
amendments have not changed much at all, and commoners continue to lack
an ability to effect change in their government. Further, Pohiva’s resignation
and the resulting discord may be early symptoms of growing political
instability.
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The Recent Amendments Are Unlikely to Change Land Tenure Laws

If little has changed politically, even less is likely to change in the
land tenure system.
Professor Guy Powles, an expert in Tongan
Constitutional law, anticipated that the issue of noble estates would be one of
the most contentious areas of Constitutional reform.148 He doubted that any
real reform to the noble estate system could happen without significant
change in the Tongan political structure.149 As noted above, the country’s
elite still largely controls the new government, so it seems unlikely that they
will allow for any statutory or Constitutional changes in property laws.
The 1875 Constitution and its related reforms brought some stability
to Tonga and respected commoner rights to an extent, but still recognized
some Tongans as privileged. So far, the recent reforms appear to be much of
the same—they bring the facade of change, but really do little. The next part
explains why land reform, though controversial, is necessary for Tonga’s
stability.
IV.

WITHOUT LAND REFORM, TONGA’S POLITICAL INSTABILITY WILL
CONTINUE

Tonga’s Constitutional and Electoral Commission (“CEC”), in its first
progress report, observed that commoners were more concerned about land
tenure than changes in political representation:
In every district, there was repeated concern about the land
issue and the fear of the consequences of any change in the
present laws relating to it, especially the likelihood of
alienation. In many cases this appeared to be a matter of more
significance and concern than electoral and representational
change or other changes to the [c]onstitution. It is noteworthy
that the concerns about land had been foreshadowed in some of
the written submissions by groups of members of the public.
The Commissioners had frequently to explain that all issues
about land and public administration, local or national, were
outside of the statutory purview of this Commission . . . . It was
apparent that many ordinary Tongans have little interest in
politics or the structure of the government. This may arise
partly from a lack of ability to affect change over many
148
149
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generations but comments in the outer districts suggest it also
stems as much from the need to support themselves and their
families and a perception that government, however formed,
will simply continue to neglect their interests.150
The CEC’s observations are telling in two ways: they demonstrate that
practical land issues are of great concern to Tongans, perhaps more so than
electoral change, and they also acknowledge that the nobility-controlled
government did not grant the CEC the power to suggest changes relating to
the land system.151
This part argues that the concern over land is predictable and has deep
roots, which can be explained using models from evolutionary ecology. This
part will clarify why Tonga’s political instability is about land, and explain
why this instability has happened recently. Then it will give some
suggestions on how Tonga can tame instability by amending the Constitution
and Land Act to: 1) reduce the nobles’ power over land rights, 2) allow for
more commoners to at least occupy land, and 3) institute policies that would
improve the productivity of commoner lands.
A.

Evolutionary Ecological Models Suggest That Tonga’s Political
Instability Is Closely Tied to Its Land Tenure System

If law’s principal endeavor is to influence human behavior according
to societal norms, its ability to change behavior, and to do so efficiently, is a
function of the accuracy of the behavioral models relied upon.152 These
models predict how human behavior will change in response to particular
laws.153
Evolutionary ecology, and in particular the subfield of Human
Behavior Ecology (“HBE”), can provide fertile ideas for how to change
human behavior using law.154 HBE focuses on the evolutionary origins of
150
CEC INTERIM REPORT, supra note 132, at 5 (emphasis added); see also Josephine Latu, Tongans
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http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=45692.
151
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Mar. 31, 2009, http://pacificmediacentre.blogspot.com/2009/06/tongans-worry-about-landadministration.html. The author is not aware of any major changes suggested by this group.
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behavior and thus provides a valuable framework for predicting it.
Accordingly, it is a useful tool for solving complex social problems,
including those involving law. This theoretical approach understands human
behavior as an evolved response to the socio-environmental context; that is,
the human psyche’s flexibility in responding to socio-environmental cues is
itself an adaptation, allowing individuals to adjust their behavior in order to
promote personal interests.155 These adjustments are not made as a result of
conscious striving for fitness (that is, reproductive success),156 but are
accomplished through intermediate goals, such as aiming for increased
prestige in one’s social group, finding mates, and securing material
resources.157
Working under this theoretical umbrella, HBE researchers have two
main predictions for human behavior: “individuals will behave in ways that
best suit their reproductive interests,” and “the prediction that people will try
to influence the social rules and other aspects of their culture in such a way
as to promote their reproductive interests.”158 A society’s laws will thus
“tend to assume a form that serves the reproductive interests” of the
powerful.159 These predictions make sense when considering Tonga’s
nobles, who have commandeered the legal system to serve their interests.
But what about the commoners?
It is paradoxical that hierarchical human societies like Tonga should
exist at all, given the pull of individual interests. Formations of human
societies result from individuals weighing the costs (for example, “increased
competition for resources, increased exposure to disease”) and benefits (for
example, “enhanced access to resources or mates”) of joining the group, and
“[w]here benefits outweigh costs, groups should form and continue to grow
as long as all the members benefit relative to dispersal or alternative
affiliation.”160 Inequality and exploitation occur when individuals have a
lack of options:
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Under conditions of intense competition or where unoccupied
territory no longer exists, the lack of alternative strategies for
individuals may promote group affiliation even in the face of
extreme disadvantage to some, perhaps most, of its members.
And it is under these conditions that particular individuals,
kingroups, or coalitions can exploit the lack of alternative
strategies as leverage to gain control of resources at the expense
of others. The result is hierarchical social organization based
on unequal access to resources . . . . [G]roups characterized by
exploitation and inequality can be said to develop out of mutual
self-interest, even if many members of the group are seriously
disadvantaged.161
This reasoning explains why Tonga is inegalitarian: the sea circumscribes
the islands, limiting people’s ability to leave, even when highly
disadvantaged in political and land rights.162 In other contexts, individuals
may move to unoccupied territory or may be able to migrate out of the area
completely.163 Additionally, fighting with those who control or hold
resources may be a viable strategy for some people.164 However, in some
contexts, the best strategy is for the commoners to accept their lot, even
though they are highly disadvantaged relative to the elite.
Throughout their history, Tongan commoners have pursued strategies
other than submission. Early on, inland migration and migration to other
islands in the archipelago was common.165 Migration to other nations is also
common—Tongan migration to Australia has been extensive.166 The Church
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of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has greatly facilitated Tongan migration
to the United States.167
Fighting the elite for control of resources is another strategy, and it is
one that Tongans have pursued at various times. Tonga has been unstable
during periods in which individuals fought for control of the islands as noted
in Part II. Individuals may choose to fight resource-holders under certain
ecological conditions168—for example, they may fight resource-holders
when the resource fought for is very valuable, or when the resource-holder is
an easy target, or when both are true.169 Thus, the particulars of an
environment determine which resources are valuable enough to fight for and
the respective costs of those fights.170 As one anthropologist put it,
“competition for resources in limited supply can directly influence the
reproductive success of the individual competitors.”171 In Tonga, land is a
limited resource as commoners are still largely dependent on subsistence
farming, and land is in short supply.172 Thus, we would expect to see
aggression related to land in Tonga. Lastly, “fighting” need not be formal
conflict or warfare—aggressive displays, including violent protests, can
serve the same purpose by intimidating resource-controllers into forfeiting
some of their control.173
B.

While Land Has Become Scarcer and Less Productive in Tonga, the
Controllers of Land Have Become Easier to Fight

Scholars have posited various theories to explain why the recent push
for Tongan democracy did not occur until late in the twentieth century.
Some have attributed the pro-democracy movement to education, while
others have explained it through teleological theories of cultural
advancement, among other rationales.174 None, however, have attempted to
explain the pro-democracy movement as a direct result of increasing
population pressures within a nation of insecure land rights. Past tensions in
167
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170
See KREBS & DAVIES, supra note 164, at 155-56.
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Tonga were inextricably entwined with the fight for control of land—why
should the current tensions be any different?
In the decades before the current pro-democracy movement gained
steam, a confluence of factors tended to reduce the amount of land available
for allotment and the value of land that commoners already held. Population
growth continued exponentially,175 due in part to the then-monarch’s (Queen
Salote’s) focus on improving health.176 Migration became more difficult,177
so those who would have moved off the islands had to stay. Further, soil
quality deteriorated so commoner allotments were less productive.178
Additionally, the perceived ability of the monarch and the nobility to
hold and defend their power and their lands may have declined. The elite
landholders may have become less likely to violently repel commoners
engaged in protests for fear of involvement from New Zealand, Australia, or
other powerful states. In fact, during the 2006 riots, the New Zealand
government refused to send troops if it would appear to be supporting the
established power structure against the pro-democracy movement.179 The
Tongan government, however, has been training its military in counterinsurgency drills as a result of the 2006 riots,180 which will make the struggle
for commoner rights even harder. The state of emergency, as mentioned in
Part III, also shows that the elite are using force to quell violence rather than
improving commoners’ lives.181 Unfortunately, it appears as if Tonga’s elites
may work to strengthen their own power, rather than improving land tenure
for commoners, in order to deal with Tonga’s instability.
C.

Solutions to Tonga’s Political Instability Lie in Amending the
Constitution and the Land Act and in Creating New Agricultural
Policies

Tonga’s instability could be solved in two ways: by strengthening the
power of the elite, so that commoners are cowed into accepting noble
exploitation, or by instituting land reform that would make violence less
attractive to the commoners. Rather than strengthening the elite, Tonga
should alter its laws and policies to secure commoner land rights, to allow
175
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for more commoners to access land, and to improve the productivity of
occupied land. To secure commoner land rights, noble control over land
must be reduced or eliminated. To allow for more commoners to access
land, allotment size may have to be reduced, new surveys must be taken, and
public works projects should focus on areas such as outer islands and other
rural areas, which may have unused and potentially productive lands.
Additionally, allotments could be revoked from commoners living abroad.
In order to harness the capital of occupied lands, the system of leases and
mortgages must be wrested from government control. Further, community
development banking may be beneficial for improving allotment
productivity. In addition, reforming the inheritance system would also
encourage commoners to better use their lands. As discussed below, changes
in the political representation system are probably necessary before the
Legislative Assembly would implement these reforms. Lastly, any disputes
regarding land issues should be appealable to the supreme court. If
executed, these reforms could improve commoner fitness and thereby reduce
the chances that commoners would engage in violent behavior against the
elite.
1.

To Secure Commoner Land Rights, Noble Control over Land Must Be
Reduced or Eliminated

Noble control over commoner lands should be eliminated by allowing
commoners who currently occupy allotments to own them outright.182 The
benefits of private property in developing economies are too numerous to
discuss in this comment,183 except to point out that secure private property
gives owners the incentive—that is, self-interest—to use land most
productively:

182

Recently, the government tried to set up the Royal Town of Neiafu in Vava‘u in order to create a
local administration that would help change traditional land laws. Tonga Government Advised Against
Change in Neiafu, RADIO N.Z. INT’L., Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=6
3231. The residents have reportedly rejected this local administration, and the government has moved out.
Id. The reporting on this topic has been unclear, and it is difficult to discern why exactly commoners have
rejected the government’s scheme.
183
For a general overview of the importance of private property to economic development, see
Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development, POLICY
ANALYSIS, Aug. 7, 2003, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa482.pdf; see also Hernando de Soto,
The Mystery of Capital, 38 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/desoto.htm.
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Why does an individual invest unless to gain something for
himself and his family? How can he ensure that gains flowing
from his activity be appropriated and secured other than
through a system of well-defined property rights? To suppose
otherwise, is to suppose that human nature will change. That
road is a dead end.184
Secure property rights would encourage commoners to use their lands more
productively—commoners would not expect the excess produce to be
diverted to nobles as tribute, nor that their lands would be suddenly snatched
from them to give to a noble’s new favored occupant. Increased allotment
productivity, combined with gains from the resources that would have gone
to nobles, will improve commoner fitness and will make it less likely that
commoners will resort to force to access and control resources. Increased
allotment productivity should also improve the Tongan economy for all
Tongans.185
One could argue that because Tongan families often use allotments as
a family, that ownership should be vested in all of them. However, familial
ownership may make it difficult to alienate the land or make decisions
regarding its use. Allotments have been granted in only one man’s name
since their inception,186 so it would not be a shock to Tongans to vest
ownership in one person as well. In addition, if alienation becomes legal,
nothing would stop Tongans from purchasing and holding property in the
names of all the family members if they so desire.
Several Constitutional amendments are required to grant commoners a
fee simple187 interest in their allotments.188 Most importantly, Clause 104
(“Land vested in crown—Sale prohibited”) would have to be modified to
remove the language “All the land is the property of the King” and “It is
hereby declared by this [c]onstitution . . . that it shall not be lawful for
anyone at any time hereafter whether he be the King or any one of the chiefs
or the people of this country to sell any land whatever in the Kingdom of
Tonga.”189 Allotments would no longer be the property of the king, and
commoners could freely alienate their lands.
184

O’Driscoll & Hoskins, supra note 183, at 7.
The ability of a formal, private property system to unlock the capital in assets is discussed in de
Soto, supra note 183.
186
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120.
187
Fee simple is defined as “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by
law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 691 (9th ed. 2009).
188
See infra, Part IV.C.4, for the process of Constitutional amendment.
189
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 104 (“Land vested in crown—Sale prohibited”).
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Interestingly, the Constitution already provides a due process clause
(Clause 18 in the Declaration of Rights), which states that “[a]ll the people
have the right to expect that the Government will protect their life[,]
liberty[,] and property and therefore it is right for all the people to support
and contribute to the Government according to law”; it also declares that fair
value will be paid in cases of eminent domain.190 This clause would, given
proper judicial interpretation, help secure commoner property rights.191
Lastly, Clause 113 (“Right to allotments”) could be amended to transform
the “right to hold an hereditary tax and town allotment” 192 into the current
occupant’s right to hold a fee simple interest in that allotment, but this could
also be achieved by amending the Land Act. The language in Clause 113
requiring the allotment-holder to pay rents193 would also have to be
removed. These amendments will obviate much of the Land Act, which
deals heavily with commoner allotments.194
The Tongan legal system is perhaps better suited to instituting a
formal private property system than other developing countries, because it
already has a centralized system in place for recording deeds.195
Centralized, formal recordation is necessary for a viable private property
system, as it allows a way to prove one’s interest in a specific property as
well as an efficient and secure means to prove the transfer of the property.196
Indeed, Clause 110 of the Constitution (“Registration of deeds”) states that
“no lease or transfer will be considered valid or recognized by the
Government unless registered in the office of the Minister of Lands.”197
Part VIII of the Land Act (“Registration of Title”)198 sets forth the steps
required to register allotments and leases, and the Act also contains required
forms for allotments, leases, and mortgages, which include a description of

190
Id. at cl. 18 (“Taxation. Compensation to be paid for property taken”). It is worth nothing that the
focus seems to be on what the government gets in exchange for according due process to its citizens, an
orientation that is not surprising given Tonga’s history.
191
A keyword search in the South Pacific legal research site paclii.org did not turn up any relevant
cases interpreting Clause 18.
192
“Every person who holds a tax and town allotment shall pay such rents therefore as may be
determined by the Legislature.” THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 113 (“Right to
allotments”).
193
Id.
194
See generally The Land Act of 1988 (Tonga).
195
See THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 110 (“Registration of deeds”); The Land Act
of 1988, part VIII (“Registration of Title”) (Tonga).
196
The importance of a formal registration system is discussed in de Soto, supra note 183.
197
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 110 (“Registration of deeds”).
198
The Land Act of 1988, part VIII (“Registration of Title”) (Tonga).
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the property involved.199 This system could easily be modified for deeds
held in fee simple. Tonga’s formal representational system would allow
Tongans to fully unlock the potential of the capital in their lands.
Allowing commoners a fee simple ownership interest in their
allotments may not be a realistic reform in the near future, given the
influence of the nobles. The Land Act could nevertheless be modified to
remove the nobles from the allotment and registration process in order to
reduce their control of commoner lands. This should allow for greater
allotment productivity and for commoners to keep more of what they
produce. As discussed above, before 1915, nobles were severed from the
allotment process—their consultation was not required for the minister of
lands to register a plot to a commoner.200 The commoner would simply
apply for the allotment, the minister of lands would approve it, and the
commoner would pay rent to the noble through the government.201 This
system kept the noble from requiring commoners to pay tribute or to
otherwise ingratiate the noble in exchange for the ability to register the
allotment. The Land Act was again amended in 1915, requiring the noble’s
consultation for allotment,202 and thus allowing nobles to go back to
demanding tribute in exchange.
The Land Act should be amended to its pre-1915 version on this issue.
This requires striking the language in Sections 8 and 34 stating that the
noble’s consultation is required for registration.203 It may be difficult,
however, to enforce this provision if commoners do not know about the legal
change. The Ministry of Lands could educate commoners, perhaps through
flyers, explaining that a noble’s permission is no longer required to register
land. These flyers could be distributed to churches to ensure that large
numbers of commoners see them. To discourage nobles from violating this
new rule, those who do so may be fined, or the amount of rent they receive
could be reduced. Nobles are already subject to criminal penalties (as well
as civil damages) under the Land Act for unlawfully dispossessing an
199

See, e.g., id. at schedule IX (“Application for lease”) (Tonga).
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120-21.
201
Id. at 120.
202
Id.; The Land Act of 1988, § 8 (“Tofias to provide allotment”) (Tonga) (“land comprised in an
hereditary estate shall not be granted as a tax or town allotment without prior consultation with the holder
of the hereditary estate”).
203
The Land Act of 1988, § 8 (“Tofias to provide allotment”) (Tonga). Section 34 currently requires
the minister of lands to grant any contested allotment, but that the noble may appeal the decision within
three months to the land court. Id. at § 34 (“Holder may not refuse land for allotment”). This commonerfriendly provision legally removes some noble control, but it does not eliminate the nobles’ incentives to
exploit the commoners in exchange for not causing trouble in the registration process.
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allotment holder,204 so these proposed penalties for nobles would not be
atypical.
Further, the Land Act should be amended to protect commoners who
have already registered allotments. Before 1915, the Land Act required that
commoners pay the government their rents in cash, and the government
would pay the rent to the noble; this was later amended so that the noble was
again paid directly.205 The government should revert to the pre-1915 Land
Act on the issue of allotment rent as well, so that the nobles would find it
more difficult to demand other tributes instead of rent. This would require
inserting language into Section 31 that mandates that a noble will receive the
statutory rent from the government after the commoner has paid the rent,
rather than directly from the commoner. The Ministry of Lands should send
notices to occupants to ensure this provision is followed, and fines should be
imposed on nobles who attempt to extract additional tributes from
commoners. Another option would be to allow the nobles to continue
receiving rents directly but to subject them to fines if they try to demand
tributes instead of the statutory rents. Again, criminal penalties for nobles
who try to circumvent this provision could be easily inserted into the Land
Act.
A last option would be to eliminate the noble completely and allow
the crown to collect and retain the rents. However, such a scheme may make
commoner land rights more insecure, as power over land would be
concentrated in the crown rather than diffused among the crown and the
thirty-three nobles,206 possibly increasing the chances for abuse. The above
reforms are thus more likely to be palatable to both nobles and commoners.
2.

Tonga Should Amend the Land Act and Change its Land Policies to
Increase the Amount of Land Available for Allotment

These reforms, however, do not directly address the problem of the
ever-increasing number of young men who will not receive land at all,
though private property may be the eventual solution to land scarcity.
Allowing current commoner occupants to own their allotments in a feesimple interest could eventually move many Tongans away from a
subsistence lifestyle, alleviating some land scarcity. For example, a Tongan
204

Id. at § 32 (“Holder may not dispossess allotment holder”).
Id. at § 31 (“Holder’s right to rents”); Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120.
206
See David Boaz, Defining an Ownership Society, CATO INSTITUTE,
http://www.cato.org/special/ownership_society/boaz.html.
205
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MARCH 2012

LAND TENURE REFORM IN TONGA

355

man who owns his land may use it more productively and keep more of the
fruits of his labors, allowing him enough capital to start a business in the
city, and perhaps to sell his allotment. Freeing the potential capital in
Tongan lands may solve the land scarcity problem as commoners move into
new market sectors and as land is used more efficiently. Instituting a
private-property system would also allow women to own land, something
that may not be possible without permitting commoners to alienate their
lands. It is difficult to see how women could also be entitled to allotments
given Tonga’s current population pressures.
If Tonga makes only modest reforms and continues to entitle each
man to an allotment, land scarcity will be a more pressing problem. This
problem could be addressed by reducing the maximum size of allotments in
the Land Act.207 In Section 7 (“Right to allotment”), the Land Act entitles
each man to up to 3.3387 hectares as a tax allotment, as well as a smaller
town allotment for his house.208 The Legislative Assembly could amend the
Land Act, reducing the maximum amount a man is entitled to. The viability
of this reform may depend on whether smaller allotments would be
adequately productive, a question that would require scientific study.
Further, there may be more land available for allotment than is
currently assumed. Tonga has performed cadastral surveys before, most
notably in 1962, and has redrawn allotment boundaries,209 but an updated
survey will accommodate the changes of the past few decades. The Land
Act allows the minister of lands to conduct boundary surveys;210 nobles,
however, have tended to resist surveys, as they are concerned about control
over their estates.211 Past surveys came at the crown’s urging,212 so it seems
likely that a new one would have to come at the king’s behest. This would
show where new allotments could be drawn.
There may also be more open land in outer islands and other rural
areas, but this land may not be as desirable because of problems such as
poorer disaster preparedness.213 Recently, the Asia Development Bank, in
conjunction with Australia’s AusAID, gave Tonga over 12 million U.S.
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This change has been suggested before in Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 138.
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dollars for infrastructure developments in Nuku‘alofa.214 But life in
Nuku‘alofa is already desirable and relatively functional as its burgeoning
population shows—perhaps a better plan would be to use some aid to
develop less inhabited areas of Tonga in preparation for further allotments.
A new cadastral survey could show whether there is productive land for
allotment that would benefit from new infrastructure.
Lastly, to increase the availability of land, the government could
heavily tax or revoke allotments from Tongans living abroad who are not
productively using their land. This reform was proposed before, and
commoners did not receive it well,215 perhaps because relatives of those
living abroad use that unoccupied land. The problem of inefficiently-used
allotments highlights the difficulties that come with legally entitling people
to property, though they do not necessarily deserve to appropriate land from
nature. Commoners who hold allotments but do not use them certainly seem
to violate the Lockean proviso.216 The nobles cannot, therefore, be blamed
for all of Tonga’s land issues, as this particular problem stems from Baker’s
reforms—the Land Act does not require commoners to use their allotments
productively, except for a provision that mandates that each allotment-holder
plant 200 coconut trees or face a fine of up to fifty Tongan dollars (about
twenty U.S. dollars).217
To be fair to those who are using abandoned allotments productively,
they could potentially apply for the allotment to be re-registered in their
name. The Land Court has stated that “ownership” of allotments can mean
something more than simply a name on a deed, and thus the court may
consider the labor that occupants have invested.218 This broader definition
of ownership could inform possible statutory changes permitting those who
are using the land to have the deed re-registered in their name. This change
should also lead to better environmental outcomes because commoners who
use their relatives’ allotments may not have an incentive to use the land
sustainably if they know their tenure is limited.219
214

Infrastructure Development in Tonga’s Capital to Get International Help, RADIO N.Z. INT’L.,
Nov. 5, 2011, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php/index.php?op=read&id=63823.
215
Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 140.
216
“Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other
Man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that in
effect, there was never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1698). For more
on the just acquisition of property, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-82 (1974).
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The Land Act of 1988, § 74 (“Allotment holder’s duty to plant, etc.”) (Tonga).
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Tonga Should Create Land Laws and Policies that Allow Commoners
to Capture the Capital Available in Their Lands

As noted above, better security in land rights should improve
allotment productivity, and creating more allotments will appease more
commoners who may be inclined to act out violently. But the government
could make other improvements by further amending the Land Act and the
Constitution, as well as by encouraging changes in aid policies. These
changes would allow commoners to use their lands more productively.
Whether or not Tonga becomes a freehold system, modifying the
system of leases and mortgages will help commoners harness the capital in
their allotments. Commoners should be allowed to lease or mortgage both
their tax and town allotments for whatever duration they see fit, without
having to go through the government to do so. Mortgages should also be
allowed for the duration that commoners and the banks desire, without
interference or need for approval from the government. This will ensure that
commoners can use their assets efficiently, improving life for commoners
and reducing the likelihood of violent behavior.
Any Constitutional or statutory provisions relating to leases and
mortgages should be eliminated. Two Constitutional provisions must be
struck: first, Clause 105 (“Terms of leases”), which requires cabinet
approval for leases and restricts their length, and second, Clause 114 (“No
lease etc. without consent”), which also requires cabinet or Privy Council
approval for leases.220
The Land Act regulates leases and mortgages extensively. Section 56
further restricts allotment leases to twenty years221 and should be removed.
Further, Section 89 (“Consent of Cabinet”) reiterates the requirement of
consent of the cabinet and should also be removed.222 Section 100
(“Conditions of mortgage by allotment holder”) requires the minister of
land’s approval for mortgages and limits the mortgage period to thirty
years.223 This provision should be removed—as noted in Part II, banks are
reluctant to make mortgages in which they may only foreclose on the
220

THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 105 (“Terms of leases”), cl. 114 (“No lease etc.
without consent”). The status of these clauses is unclear after other 2010 Constitutional amendments
related to executive power. See CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 108.
221
The Land Act of 1988, § 56 (“Tax or town allotment may be leased”) (Tonga). Note that Section
57 ensures that the registered allotment holder remains liable to the noble for the yearly rent. Id. at § 57
(“Rentals”).
222
Id. at § 89 (“Consent of Cabinet”).
223
Id. at § 100 (“Conditions of mortgage by allotment holder”).
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allotment for the balance of the thirty years. Eliminating these restrictions
will allow commoners to lease and mortgage their lands in their own best
interests. Interestingly, rents were previously determined by executive order,
but later “His Majesty in Council ordered that the rental be such as is agreed
between the parties.”224 Allowing the parties to set their rates indicates that
the Privy Council may not be averse to allowing them to decide the length of
their leases and mortgages as well.
The above reforms on mortgages may not be effective if banks remain
leery of loaning to commoners. Tonga should encourage its many
international development donors to provide credit to individual parties to
improve their allotments, rather than to the Tongan government. This
approach requires that Tonga seriously consider the negative impact that
foreign aid may be having on its economy. Traditional development banking
has been at its worst harmful to economic development, and at its best,
inconsequential.225 As noted above, development aid could possibly be
better used in preparing unoccupied areas of Tonga for allotment. But a
sounder approach may be to encourage foreign governments, such as
Australia, to switch from development banking to community development
banking (“CDB”). CDB focuses on loaning to individuals, placed in small
community or family groups, rather than to governments.226 It has not been
successful everywhere, but success stories, including the famous
Bangladeshi Grameen banks and banks in other communities “with
relatively homogeneous and geographically immobile populations,”227
provide some evidence that CDB would work in Tonga. Successful CDB
banking schemes share some common themes: 1) each loan is relatively
small, 2) the villages participating are small, so monitoring of CDB
members is easier, 3) family ties of participants are strong, and 4) rural
laborers are not able to substitute their labor for urban work, thereby
decreasing the chances for default.228 In Tonga, family ties are strong,229 and
people are generally rural laborers who may have little possibility of labor
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Id. at § 57 (“Rentals”).
See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO
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substitution.230 Migration from Tonga could create default problems, but the
decreasing ability of Tongans to migrate would make this less likely. Tonga
seems an ideal place to try CDB. Donors really have nothing to lose—the
Tongan government recently misplaced hundreds of thousands of dollars in
New Zealand aid, a mishap that was later found to be an accounting error.231
Other opportunities for change include reforming the inheritance
system to allow allotment holders more freedom in deciding to whom to
divest their allotment. For example, women have no inheritance rights
unless no male heir exists, and when there are no legally-prescribed heirs at
all, the plot of land escheats to the noble estate-holder or to the
government.232 Allowing the commoners more freedom in disposing of their
allotments may encourage them to invest more in their land and to use more
environmentally-sound agricultural practices for the benefit of their desired
heirs.233
4.

Extensive Changes in the Tongan Political Structure May Be
Necessary to Achieve Land Reforms

The current government is unlikely to make changes in the land tenure
system, but it would serve them well to do so. In the past, land disputes
were decided with war, and the possibility of large-scale commoner violence
may no longer be so remote. Without some change, commoners will be
likely to act aggressively and may endanger nobles and their property.
However, some kind of further political change is probably necessary
to reform the land tenure system.234 Currently, commoners are calling for a
Constitutional amendment that would allow them to elect the noble members
as well as the people’s members.235 This may be a good compromise
position for now—nobles would still hold power, but would have to compete
to garner commoner support.

230
Labor substitution is probably the factor most likely to undermine community development
banking in Tonga, as there has been a general trend of internal migration toward urban areas. James, supra
note 30, at 181.
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Audit of Tongan Aid Money Finds No Fraud, RADIO N.Z, Dec. 4, 2011,
http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/92753/audit-of-tongan-aid-money-finds-no-fraud.
232
THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 111 (“Law of sucession”), cl. 112 (“Estate
without heirs to revert to the crown”).
233
See Stevens, supra note 32, at 164.
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See Powles, supra note 117, at 124 (arguing that changes to the Constitution relating to noble
estates will be difficult under current political conditions).
235
Push to Further Extend Democracy in Tonga, RADIO N.Z. INT’L, Oct. 24, 2011,
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=63930.
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More political representation may help commoners pass amendments
related to land. The Constitution can be amended according to Clause 79,
which allows the Legislative Assembly to discuss amendments not related to
succession of the throne and the estates and titles of nobles.236 The
Legislative Assembly must pass the amendment three times, and the Privy
Council and cabinet must be unanimously in favor of the amendment, at
which point the king can assent to the amendment and sign it into law.237
While Clause 79 seems to give commoner representatives a lot of hoops to
jump through, the Privy Council and cabinet did agree to the recent
amendments with public pressure. As noted above, however, any
amendments related to land tenure may be much more difficult to pass,238
and whether Clause 79 would outlaw discussion of the proposed
Constitutional amendments is another issue. Clause 79 may effectively
constrain land tenure reform to the bounds of the Land Act.
Though Constitutional or statutory reforms are necessary to secure
commoner land rights, they are not sufficient. To ensure commoners can
enforce their rights, the court system must be modified. The Land Court,
made up of judges and assessors appointed by the king, and the Privy
Council, which hears appeals,239 may not be sympathetic to the claims of
commoners. To remedy this, the Land Court should include commoners, or
at the very least, its decisions should be appealable only to the supreme court
and court of appeal, which have recently handed down quite pro-commoner
decisions.240 Unfortunately, the king has recently taken steps to regain
control of the judiciary by controlling appointments, which an independent
commission had previously made,241 so it is unclear how pro-commoner the
supreme court and court of appeal will remain.
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“Culture” Should Not Come Before Commoner Rights and National
Stability

A common counterargument to significant land reform in Tonga is that
the land tenure system, including the traditional role of the nobles, is an
essential part of Tongan culture and must be protected. There are indications
that commoners are angry with the king and the nobles, and that they find
the “cultural” requirement to defer to them to be burdensome or unsavory.
On an internet discussion forum called the “Kavabowl,” Tongans discuss
political issues in their country and are free to comment on the social
hierarchy that exists there.242 One Tongan commented: “values and
moralities are being exploited, in political terms, by the authorities to
maintain the status quo in the name of a monster so called ‘Tradition’ (the
idyllic and romanticized past).”243 In another post, a member wrote a poem
that concluded: “It was not the nobles with their greedy and grand old
ploys/Who gave us freedom that our little island now enjoys.”244 Such
displays of commoner disrespect toward nobles are not rare.245 In any case,
if such a cultural norm does exist, Tongans must still decide if it is worth
more than equality.
One anthropologist noted the tension between the commoners’
obligations to culture and the pursuit of their freedoms:
I concluded that the demand had originated from the noble
himself . . . . The feast demand occurred when commoner
parliament members were spearheading a movement for
democratization . . . . Coincidentally, in another village close to
where I worked, commoners had recently refused to use their
own resources to provide their noble with a demanded feast.246
Commoners must decide whether it is worth enduring these demands in the
name of culture. The pro-democracy movement, the 2006 riots, and the
recent Constitutional amendments indicate that commoners are beginning to
place their rights and freedoms ahead of culture. This comment suggests
legal and policy strategies for formally prioritizing individual liberties over
tradition.
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Morton, supra note 43, at 51.
Id. at 52.
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See Stevens, supra note 32, at 158-60.
Id. at 157.
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CONCLUSION

Tonga’s ancient hierarchy was largely enshrined in the 1875
Constitution and the 1882 Land Act. The election of 2010 under the
“ordinary peoples’ Constitution,” allowing for increased commoner
representation, has created a government unlikely to reform land laws and
policies in favor of commoners. However, the laws must change if the
government wishes to quell violent political protests, as people will continue
to be motivated to fight for increased access and control of land. This
comment offers solutions in the form of changes to the Constitution and the
Land Act, and new land policies, which would decrease noble control of
commoner lands, open up more lands for allotment, and help make
commoner lands more productive.
The CEC’s first report on Constitutional changes cautioned that the
pro-democracy movement should be balanced by considering ancient
Tongan culture.247 Yet, Tongans themselves, both nobles and commoners,
must decide whether “cultural preservation” is more important than equality
in land and political rights and thus more important than their country’s
stability.
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See CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.

